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COMPUTER SIMULATIONS IN LITIGATION:
ARE TELEVISION GENERATION JURORS
BEING MISLED?
I. INTRODUCTION
A two-minute video, if well made, will make a greater impres-
sion on the minds and emotions of jurors than the world's best
expert. Once jurors see the video, the images will be graven on
their minds. In fact, opponents of videotapes argue that a jury
will never be able to evaluate intellectual criticism of a video's
validity, no matter how devastating the cross-examination of the
sponsoring expert. The familiar power of television will shoulder
everything else aside. The very value of using the videotape-its
ability to impress and explain-is thus the source of the most per-
suasive argument against its use.'
The invention of television has inexorably altered the manner in
which our society receives information. Generations have grown to
adulthood accompanied by this medium, making it a familiar and trusted
presence by those who partake of its monologue. Add to this the advent
of computer technology and the video screen has now become an inter-
active tool capable of incomprehensible power. In so many aspects of
life, society has become dependent upon the power and facility of the
computer. The newest frontier upon which the computer has staked its
claim is the courtroom.
By virtue of someone feeding data into a system that uses specialized
software programs, a computer can generate a re-creation of an event
that simulates what might have happened at a particular time and place.
The computer synthesizes complex and voluminous data, which would
otherwise require a painstaking and potentially confusing explanation to
the jury, and presents it in a coherent, effective, familiar package. In
short, the jury can sit back and watch a video re-creation of the scenario
in question, rather than having to digest a necessary but nonetheless tire-
some and confusing string of statistics and facts.
Such an application has incredible potential for constructive use, but
as with any other innovation with such potential, the possible misuse and
misunderstanding could be disastrous. In today's "television age," are
jurors simply seeing these re-creations as what "must have happened,"
1. Sharon Panian, Comment, Truth, Lies, and Videotape: Are Current Federal Rules of
Evidence Adequate?, 21 Sw. U. L. Rlv. 1199, 1214 (1992) (quoting Eli Chernow, From the
Bench. Video the Courtroom - More than a Talking Head, Lrri., Fall 1988, at 5).
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believing it to be reality simply because its derivation is a computer and
the medium is television? What are the potential misuses associated
with computer simulations? Are current standards of admissibility effec-
tively screening these simulations?
This Comment will first discuss the facts and history behind computer
simulations in the courtroom. Next, the current standards of admissibil-
ity governing these simulations will be examined. An analysis of the psy-
chological and emotional impact of computer graphic simulations on
jurors will follow. Finally, this Comment will examine the great poten-
tial for misuse and misunderstanding with regard to computer simula-
tions and argue that courts should be more wary with respect to the
admission and use of these. simulations because their effect on jurors
might well outweigh their basis in fact.
II. Tim MECHANICS OF COMPUTER SIMULATIONS
At the outset, a critical distinction must be made between computer
simulation and computer animation. Computer animation involves an
artistic rendering of an image that is altered slightly frame by frame in
order to mimic actual movement, and that which is displayed on the
screen is the totality of the exhibit.2 Computer simulation, on the other
hand, involves the input of many sophisticated rules of physics (such as
friction coefficients, effects of gravity, laws of acceleration, etc.), which
form the parameters within which the facts of the particular scenario
operate. 3 The exhibit that is presented to the jury, therefore, involves
infinitely more than the simple image displayed on the screen. As one
author noted, "[w]ith animation, viewers see a car moving; with a simula-
2. C. Caverhill Schaefer et al., Computer Simulations in Court, TRIAL, July 1987, at 69,70.
3. d. at 70. Some authorities draw a further distinction between computer simulations
and computer reconstructions. One author states:
A computer simulation is an artificially created extrapolation of an event represented
by limited data or input that continues the event beyond the stated mathematical or
factual basis; in other words, a simulation provides information about what would have
happened or alternate theories of the accident ... A computer-generated accident re-
construction, on the other hand, is an explanation of what in fact happened. In com-
puter reconstruction, known parameters, data, and facts derived from the accident
investigation are entered into a computer. Based on this input, the computer may be
able to supply missing information.
Kathlynn G. Fadely, Use of Computer-Generated Visual Evidence in Aviation Litigation: Inter-
active Video Comes to Court, 55 J. Am L. & CoM. 839, 842-43 (1990). Computer simulation
and reconstruction are similar, she concedes, in that they both "fill in the blanks." Id. For the
purposes of this Comment, the term "simulation" will be used.
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tion model, they see an accurate' portrayal of the movements of the car
under specified conditions and in compliance with the laws of physics."5
The first step in the creation of a computer simulation model is input-
ting the three-dimensional 6 coordinates of the objects that were present
at the accident scene.7 The next step involves calculation of the motions
of each object that played a significant role in the accident.8 The testi-
mony and observances of eyewitnesses and accident reconstructionists
also are taken into account, but since this testimony is relevant "only for
certain 'benchmark' moments,.., the computer must otherwise fill in
the gaps."9 Therefore, while the laws of science provide the rules by
which the evidence of the specific incident must abide, the computer
provides the best fit within these rules for the complex data handed to it.
After the data is fed into the computer, the product is recorded in
either videotape or laser disk -format. While a videotape production
4. The use of the term "accurate" is somewhat colored and should be taken as such, as the
accuracy of computer simulations is questioned by many in the field." 'These models accept
data which is representative of actual events, manipulate this data according to sets of rules
which represent how the world works, and present results which are an approximation of the
actual results.'" Craig Murphy, Comment, Computer Simulations and Video Re-enactment
Fact, Fantasy and Admission Standards, 17 Omo N.U. L. REv. 145, 147 (1990) (quoting
Martha M. Jenkins, Computer-Generated Evidence Specially Prepared for Use at Trial, 52 CI.-
KENT L. REv. 600, 601 (1976)).
5. Schaefer et al., supra note 2, at 70.
6. This presupposes that the simulation is created in three dimensions. TWo-dimensional
simulations are used as well.
7. Barry Sullivan, Computer-Generated Re-Enactments as Evidence in Accident Cases, 3
HIGH TEcH. L.J. 193, 200 (1988).
8. 1d.
9. Id, A good example of how such data is used to create an accident simulation is in the
case of an airline disaster, as explained in the following excerpt:
Since aviation accidents involve the analysis of the movements of many objects in a
three dimensional world with critical events occurring at known times, it is an area
particularly well suited to the computer reconstruction technique .... The computer is
programmed with aircraft velocity, heading and rates of climb or descent or, con-
versely, the entering of known physical locations and times from which the computer
will determine the aircraft velocity, heading, and rate of climb or descent. The com-
puter program already has built into it all of the physics associated with banks and
turns so that if a bank angle is specified the computer determines the rate of turn and
the turn radius, or, conversely, the entering of aircraft headings at known times from
which the computer computes the bank angle, rate of turn and turn radius. These geo-
metrical time and space computations are a prerequisite to any analysis of human vis-
ual performance, because it is only in this way that we are able to determine the
conditions of observation.
Mark A. Dombroff, Demonstrative Evidence and its Effective Use in Aviation Litigation, PLI
Order No. H4-4999, available in Westlaw, TP-ALL database, at *49 (1986).
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takes less time and is significantly less expensive,' ° laser disk technology
offers many advantages. In addition to having a higher degree of resolu-
tion, the laser disk format allows for nearly instantaneous recall of any of
the 54,000 frames stored on a single side of one disk." This "interactive
video,"'12 as it is referred to, allows an attorney the luxury of avoiding
time-wasting fast-forwarding and rewinding that is necessary in a video-
taped simulation.'
The end product of these processes is a coherent re-creation of any-
thing from an automobile accident to a homicide. At the appropriate
moment, such a simulation would be shown to a jury14 as the propo-
nent's theory of how the events in fact occurred. The proponent even
has the ability to present many possible theories with this technology-
including that of the opponent.' 5 All that is required is for the propo-
nent to take the data upon which the opposition bases its theory and
input that data into its own simulation model. The consequences for the
opposition would be disastrous if the events played out on screen, based
on the opponent's theories and data, lent credibility to the proponent's
theory of the accident.
There are several situations in which the use of a computer simula-
tion is particularly valuable:
1. If the visualization of an event or an object is complicated by
the dynamics of the situation;
2. If the "real time" of the event is a crucial factor;
3. If a physical re-creation of the event is made impracticable
due to expense or danger;
4. If the situation is too complex for an expert to clearly explain
or a layperson to clearly understand; or
5. If other visual representations of the event would not yield a
worthwhile presentation (the example given is the situation where
"the elapsed time is too short for any other medium to show the
details"' 6 ).
10. Laser disk recordings cost at least $2000 more per product than standard videotape.
Roy Krieger, Now Showing at a Courtroom Near You.... A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 94.
11. Id.
12. See generally Fadely, supra note 3, at 853.
13. Krieger, supra note 10, at 94.
14. The uses of computer simulations in the legal field are not limited to in-trial display.
In some cases, such simulations are used in depositions and have been effective tools in en-
couraging settlement prior to trial. Schaefer et al., supra note 2, at 73-74.
15. Id. at 72; see infra text accompanying note 126.
16. Id. at 70-72.
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Computer simulations provide tremendous presentation advantages,
such as stop-action, varied perspectives, and slow motion, yet each of
these advantages is accompanied by a concomitant disadvantage and po-
tential misuse, as this Comment will explore in a later section.17
II. CuRRENT STANDARDS OF ADMiSSmIIY
There are several routes an attorney can take in attempting to get a
computer simulation admitted at trial. While the most common tech-
nique, and often viewed as the most simplistic, is to bring the simulation
in through expert testimony, it is only one of the many options available.
The standards of admissibility in this area are a hodgepodge of evi-
dentiary rules, including: Federal Rules of Evidence, common-law stan-
dards, and other general admissibility standards. The standard or
combination of standards used depends on the particular jurisdiction and
court in which the case is tried. Although the United States Supreme
Court attempted to resolve some of these evidentiary questions in its
recent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 8 the
holding applies to computer simulation admissions only in limited
circumstances.
A. Significant Cases Laying the Groundwork for the Admissibility of
Computer Simulations
Although the number of cases discussing the admissibility of com-
puter simulations is sparse, there are some cogent examples that demon-
strate a concrete trend in the direction of wider acceptance of computer
simulations. In Perma Research & Development v. Singer Co.,19 the Sec-
ond Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals affirmed a seven mil-
lion dollar judgment against Singer Company where a computer
simulation was relied on by an expert to determine whether an anti-skid
device of an automobile's braking system could be perfected.2' Since the
experts claimed that the computer simulation was their work product
and was, therefore, confidential information, an evidentiary hearing re-
garding its technical bases was considered "tangential," and the simula-
tion was not shown during trial.21 The verdict, however, was obviously
17. Id. at 72-73; see discussion infra part V.
18. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
19. 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
20. Alan Aldous, Note, Disclosure of Expert Computer Simulations, 8 CoMpu=/RL.J. 51,
52 (1987).
21. Perma, 542 F.2d at 115. Furthermore, the appellate court held that:
1994]
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influenced by expert opinion that was based on a computer simulation.
Perma laid the original foundation for the use of computer simulations
in a trial setting, even though the simulation was never seen by the
jury.2 2
One year later, in 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp.23 heard a case involving an automo-
bile collision in which an expert's testimony was based on a computer
simulation.24 The plaintiff claimed that his Cadillac, manufactured by
the defendant, malfunctioned due to an optional device called the "con-
trolled differential." 2 This device allegedly:
caused the rear of his car to sway from side to side (to fishtail) on
the wet highway until the right rear wheel encountered the rough
macadam surface of the breakdown lane at which point the differ-
ential transferred traction to that wheel. The car then shot left
across the road, went over the median, and into the eastbound
lane where it was struck. 6
This appellate court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial
court due to, among other things, a wrongful admission of expert testi-
mony based upon a computer simulation.27 In so doing, the court at-
tempted to establish criteria for the trial court to follow when
determining the admissibility of computer simulations. The standard
dictated by the Schaeffer court is that the trial judge should conduct a
hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine "whether the tests
While it might have been better practice for opposing counsel to arrange for the deliv-
ery of all details of the underlying data and theorems employed in these simulations in
advance of trial to both avoid unnecessarily belabored discussion of highly technical,
tangential issues at trial, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(A), and protect truly proprietary as-
pects of the programs... .The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the
experts to testify as to this particular basis for their ultimate conclusion that the Perma
device was indeed perfectible.
Id-
22. See infra part III.A-C.
23. 360 N.E.2d 1062 (Mass. 1977).
24. Id. at 1064.
25. Id.
26. Id. The controlled differential was described in the owner's manual as:
always direct[ing] the major driving force to the wheel having the greater traction. The
Controlled Differential makes driving safer and more economical by providing addi-
tional traction in snow, ice, mud, sand and gravel, particularly when one rear wheel is
on a surface providing poor traction. During normal driving and cornering, the con-
trolled unit functions as a standard differential. When one wheel encounters a slippery
surface, however, the Controlled Differential allows the wheel with the greater traction
to drive the car.
I2 a27. Id. at 1062.
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conducted and results ascribed thereto meet the prescribed standards for
the admissibility of such evidence," and that the judge's findings of fact
regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence should be put on
record.8
In People v. McHugh,29 a 1984 case, the Supreme Court of New York
ruled that a computer simulation should be admitted without a separate
evidentiary hearing. The defendant, Michael McHugh, was charged with
four counts of second degree manslaughter and intoxicated driving after
four teens died as a result of an automobile accident.3 0 McHugh main-
tained that he was neither intoxicated nor speeding. He asserted that
the weather caused his automobile to leave the road and hit an electrical
box, which in turn caused a tire blowout sending the car into the em-
bankment. The court allowed McHugh to use a-computer simulation
that visually demonstrated his theory of the accident. The court stated:
A computer is not a gimmick and the court should not be shy
about its use, when proper. Computers are simply mechanical
tools-receiving information and acting on instructions at light-
ning speed. When the results are useful, they should be accepted,
when confusing, they should be rejected. What is important is
that the presentation be relevant to a possible defense, that it
fairly and accurately reflect the oral testimony offered and that it
be an aid to the jury's understanding of the issue.31
In addition, the court required McHugh's attorney to give a copy of the
computer software used in the simulation to the District Attorney to ex-
pedite the trial process.32 This decision opened the door to the admis-
sion of computer simulations in trials.
As will be explored in the following section, admission standards for
computer simulations have become more lenient as the technology has
become more commonplace. Admission of evidence is generally re-
viewed under an abuse of discretion standard and, therefore, appellate
courts often leave the admission of computer simulations within the
"sound discretion" of the trial court.33 What is evident throughout the
opinions is that computer simulations, like computers themselves, are
now given d wider berth with respect to admissibility than they were in
28. Id. at 1067.
29. 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1984).
30. Id. at 722.
31. Id. at 722-23.
32. Id. at 723
33. Feaster v. New York City 'ransit Auth., 568 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (1991).
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the past. They were originally viewed with trepidation, but are now seen
as benign tools. This view may be a bit too trusting.
B. Common-Law and Other General Standards of Admissibility
Apart from the Federal Rules of Evidence, though often intermin-
gled with the Rules for purposes of admission, there are certain com-
mon-law standards utilized by courts to analyze whether to permit
computer simulations in the courtroom. The first of these is the so-
called "Frye Standard," based on a 1923 case in which the admissibility
of a prototype polygraph machine's data testified to by an expert witness
was brought into question2 4 Although the Supreme Court expressly
overruled the Frye Standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,35 its impact upon evidentiary standards in both state and federal
trials is still quite significant.
The Frye court held that "while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs. ' 6 While some courts still utilize this older
"general acceptance" test,3 7 many have rejected it as archaic and
vague, 8 seeking more precise standards, while still others have used it as
a component of a hybrid standard. 9
Backers of the Frye standard argue that its advantages are as follows:
The perceived benefits of Frye center on its conservative nature
and the fact that it excludes evidence that is not proven to be
sufficiently accurate. Proponents of the Frye standard assert that
the principal justification for the standard is that it screens out
unreliable scientific evidence, providing for greater accuracy and
fairness at trial.4n
34. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
35. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
36. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
37. See Starr v. Campos, 655 P.2d 794 (Ariz. 1982); State ex reL Collins v. Superior Court,
644 P.2d 1266 (Ariz. 1982), overruled by State v. LeMaster, 669 P.2d 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
38. Robert Seltzer, Effective Communication: Seeing Is Believing, PLI Order No. H4-
5053, available in Westlaw, TP-ALL database, at *35 (1988).
39. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); see also discussion infra part VI.
40. Seltzer, supra note 38, at *30.
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The opponents of the Frye standard cite the nebulous aspects of the
"general acceptance" language, and the difficulty in pinpointing the
"particular field" in which the expert should be judged.4'
In Daubert,42 the United States Supreme Court expressly overruled
the Frye Standard for all federal cases.43 The Court held that the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which were promulgated approximately fifty years
after Frye, superseded the Frye Standard, which was established in
1923.44 The holding stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence present
the appropriate standards by which expert scientific evidence should be
examined for purposes of admission.4 5 In contrast, Frye's "rigid 'general
acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the
Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional bar-
riers to "opinion" testimony.' "46 The "austere" general acceptance
standard presented by Frye is "incompatible with the Federal Rules of
Evidence" and "should not be applied in federal trials."47
While Daubert clears up some of the confusion in federal cases, its
impact upon state court decisions is not yet clear, and will not be for
some time. Furthermore, Daubert adds new confusion because it pro-
vides little guidance to trial judges on how to rule on these issues, and it
addresses only "scientific" evidence, and not technical or other special-
ized evidence (thereby bringing to the fore the question of what is "sci-
entific"). Finally, the question arises of whether Daubert is simply a
thinly veiled application of Frye.48 While Frye has taken quite a beating
in the wake of this decision, it is not yet dead.
While the Frye Standard allows for a computer simulation to be ad-
mitted via expert testimony, independent bases of admissibility offer
other advantages. An attorney would ideally want a computer simula-
tion to be admitted as independent substantive evidence, as opposed to
merely being shown once to the jury on the heels of an expert, or even
worse merely being described through an expert's testimony rather than
actually shown.49
41. Id. at *36.
42. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
43. Id. at 2793.
44. Id. at 2794.
45. Id. at 2799.
46. Id. at 2794 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
47. Id. (citation omitted). See infra part IH.C for a discussion of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the concomitant admission standards.
48. Daniel Blinka, Scientific Evidence in Wisconsin after Daubert, Wis. LAW., Nov. 1993,
at 10, 13.
49. Paul Marcotte, Animated Evidence, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 52, 55.
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In order for a computer simulation to be admitted as substantive evi-
dence, it must comply with all of the rules of evidence used in the spe-
cific court, as opposed to the limited requirements of admission via an
expert witness. Two of the more common challenges require that the
demonstration be fair and accurate, as established through proper au-
thentication, and that it satisfy potential evidentiary exclusions such as
hearsay.50 With respect to a computer simulation, the former criterion,
that of authentication, requires testimony to qualify the hardware and
software used as fair and accurate. 1 If the hardware is of a name brand,
and the software is commercially available, not only will qualification be
easy, but the court may even take judicial notice of its accuracy. 2
While admission of a computer simulation as substantive evidence
may be desirable, this may not be possible, and fall-back admission tech-
niques are necessary. Another avenue through which computer simula-
tions may be admitted into evidence is as "demonstrative evidence."
Demonstrative evidence "consists of things... which can convey a rele-
vant firsthand sense impression to the trier of fact, as opposed to those
which serve merely to report the secondhand sense impression of
others. 53 The admission of demonstrative evidence is justified because
it" 'requires only that the item be sufficiently explanatory or illustrative
of relevant testimony in the case to be of potential help to the trier of
fact.' 154
The hurdles for admission of demonstrative evidence are not very
high. One article expands upon the admission standards for demonstra-
tive evidence:
A lesser showing is needed to introduce computer generated
evidence such as charts, diagrams and simulations that are offered
as demonstrative evidence. Because this type of evidence lacks
independent probative value, generally all that is required is a
demonstration that the evidence is fair and accurate. In short,
50. David Siegel & Brian Pass, High Technology at Tria. Use It or Lose It, PLI Order No.
H4-5138, available in Westlaw, TP-ALL database, *13 (1992).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 212, at 663 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). Exam-
ples of demonstrative evidence include, but certainly are not limited to: "weapons, whiskey
bottles, writings .... wearing apparel," and computer simulations. Id.
54. Pilkington v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 460 N.E.2d 1000,
1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting McComicK ON EVIDENCE § 212 (Edward W. Cleary ed.,
2d ed. 1972)).
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demonstrative evidence avoids hearsay problems because it is not
offered for its truth.'
In addition to proof that the evidence is fair and accurate, the propo-
nent of the simulation must demonstrate its authenticity, which is "the
process that identifies a given piece of evidence, links it to the contro-
versy, and provides an appropriate basis for admission. '56 Once an ade-
quate foundation for its admission has been laid, the computer
simulation is entered into evidence. 57
The pivotal criterion for the admission of this type of evidence is that
it pass the "substantial similarity" test; the simulation must be "substan-
tially similar to what it represents" in order for it to be admitted.58 The
substantial similarity test has been applied inconsistently by different
courts,5 9 however, and some of this inconsistency
may relate to the artificial difference between tapes introduced to
illustrate expert testimony, and tapes introduced as accident re-
creations. Tapes that illustrate expert opinion or demonstrate a
litigation theory or scientific principle, are generally admissible
without any requirement that the depiction be substantially iden-
tical to the actual incident. However, if a judge believes a tape is
an attempt to re-create an accident, rather than illustrate expert
testimony, it is much more likely to be excluded. If a videotaped
reenactment is to be admitted, the conditions under which the
tape is made must be substantially similar to those prevailing at
55. Siegel & Pass, supra note 50, at *15-16. The fact that it is not offered for its truth,
however, is one of the most elusive factors involved in computer simulations. The later sec-
tions of this Comment will examine the potential for misunderstanding by a jury, and this
element goes to the heart of the issue. Juries may believe that a computer simulation is indeed
offered for its truth, and not merely as a theoretical examination of the circumstances around
which the case arose.
56. Murphy, supra note 4, at 154. The Federal Rule of Evidence upon which the authen-
ticity requirement is based is Rule 901(a):
Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
FED. R. EVID. 901.
57. Murphy, supra note 4, at 154.
58. Id. at 154.
59. See Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part,
820 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1987) (trial court admitting videotaped reconstruction and appellate
court reversing on grounds that differences in actual accident and reconstruction were not
substantially similar); Pittman v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 368 So. 2d 238 (Miss. 1979)
(trial court admitting film, reasoning that lack of substantial similarity went to weight of evi-
dence as opposed to issue of admissibility; appellate court reversing).
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the time of the accident, and the judge may need to give special
jury instructions.60
The substantial similarity test presents the threshold issue for a
court's consideration. If the simulation is too attenuated with respect to
the incident it is re-creating, it is likely that a court would refuse to admit
it. It is still possible, however, that even an attenuated simulation would
be admitted if it was brought in via expert testimony, since it would
likely bypass the substantial similarity test.6'
The lingering question is whether courts will be able to decipher the
foundations of computer simulations to the degree necessary to make an
accurate determination as to whether the simulation is substantially simi-
lar to the event it is re-creating. The resounding fear is that judges sim-
ply will assume that the simulation is based on accurate data that is
substantially similar to the actual event, and not actually screen the sim-
ulation with respect to the substantial similarity question.
Ultimately, the decision of whether to admit demonstrative evidence
lies exclusively in the broad discretion of the trial court.6' In other
words, the admission standards under this method are only as stringent
as the court wants them to be. In the majority of courts, then, assuming
one has laid the proper foundation for its admission, a computer simula-
tion would be admitted as demonstrative evidence.
C. Admission Standards Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide a coherent set of rules gov-
erning evidentiary questions, and they are present in one form or an-
other in most, if not all, courtrooms. In the wake of Daubert, these rules
are of particular importance in federal cases involving expert scientific
evidence, which impacts significantly on computer simulations.
The first of the Federal Rules of Evidence that provides a basis for
admission of expert testimony is Rule 702, which states, "[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ' '6 3 This stan-
60. Panian, supra note 1, at 1213-14 (citations omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id.; Fadely, supra note 3, at 879.
63. FED. R. EviD. 702. The advisory committee's note clarifies the posture of the rule:
An intelligent evaluation of the facts is often difficult or impossible without the
application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The most
[Vol. 77:829
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dard is quite liberal, and the court must simply judge whether or not that
particular expert is qualified to testify as an expert based upon the crite-
ria set forth in Rule 702. If that expert is then determined to have less
than superior credentials, the expert's testimony is not barred, but
merely given less weight by the trier of fact.64 Since such technical
knowledge needs to be diffused to a jury through the explanatory abili-
ties of a qualified expert, the admission standards with respect to Rule
702 are rather liberal.65
The door to admissibility swings wide open, however, through Rule
703. The rule allows experts to base their opinions on material that need
not be admissible into evidence, as long as it is "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field."66 Under Rule 703, ex-
perts could even base their testimony on hearsay (frequently inadmissi-
ble), due to the assumption that experts are able to properly sift through
the hearsay and weigh it accordingly.67 The reason courts liberally allow
common source of this knowledge is the expert witness, although there are other tech-
niques for supplying it.
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of opinions. The
assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on
the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant
to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Since much of the
criticism of expert testimony has centered upon the hypothetical question, it seems wise
to recognize that opinions are not indispensable and to encourage the use of expert
testimony in non-opinion form when counsel believes the trier can itself draw the req-
uisite inference. The use of opinions is not abolished by the rule, however. It will
continue to be permissible for the experts to take the further step of suggesting the infer-
ence which should be drawn from applying the specialized knowledge to the facts.
FED. R. EvD. 702 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
64. Aldous, supra note 20, at 54 (citation omitted); see also Fadely, supra note 3, at 870.
65. Fadely, supra note 3, at 869-70.
66. FED. R. EviD. 703. The rule, in its entirety, is as follows:
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
Id.
67. Aldous, supra note 20, at 55-56. In order to make the determination of whether or
not experts "reasonably rely" upon such facts and data, the court must have a separate hear-
ing outside of the presence of the jury. This affords opposing counsel the opportunity to
obtain the otherwise protected facts and data supporting the computer simulation. There are
two predominant views guiding this determination: the first involves an inquiry into both (a)
whether or not the facts and data are reasonably relied upon in the field, and (b) whether or
not the facts and data are trustworthy considering hearsay and other factors. The second
inquiry merely requires an examination of the reasonable reliance in the expert's field, and
does not require an inquiry into the trustworthiness of the underlying material. See id. at 57.
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such expert testimony is to make complex material, which is not easily
understood by a lay person, comprehensible to the trier of fact.68
In the field of aviation litigation, for example, experts reasonably
rely on computer simulations, "and these simulations should be admissi-
ble upon a showing that the degree of reliability of modeling technique
employed is consistent with the state of the art."'69 Furthermore, be-
cause testimony may be couched as a hypothetical question under Rules
703 and 704, a computer simulation may be shown as a graphical descrip-
tion of how the expert theorizes that the event in question "hypotheti-
cally" occurred.70 Rule 703, therefore, presents an attorney with a
smooth avenue through which a computer simulation can be shown to a
jury. As long as the facts and data underlying the simulation are those
"reasonably relied upon" by experts in the field, the simulation is fair
game.
Another way in which expert testimony may be used with respect to
the admissibility of a computer simulation is under Rule 705: "The ex-
pert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons there-
fore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. '71 In other
words, experts may give testimony without having to disclose the under-
lying facts or data leading them to their opinion, unless required to do so
by the court. This is another rule designed to make expert testimony
more clearly understood by the triers of fact, because the expert need
not bog down the testimony with technical details too complicated for
the jury to digest.72 Furthermore, the facts and data supporting the ex-
pert's testimony are open to cross-examination through Rule 403.73
The corollary to Rule 402, providing that "all relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided," 74 is Rule 403, which states
that: "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'7
68. Fadely, supra note 3, at 869.
69. Id. at 869-70 (citation omitted).
70. FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note.
71. FED. R. EvnD. 705.
72. Aldous, supra note 20, at 54.
73. FED. R. Evm. 403.
74. FED. R. EvD. 402.
75. FED. R. Evrn. 403. The advisory committee's note states the following:
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One author deftly examines how two scenarios demonstrate that Rule
403 can be used to exclude expert testimony which, although relevant
under Rule 401, is confusing, misleading, or too time consuming:
One scenario is where an expert is not required to disclose the
underlying basis for his simulation, misleading the jury as to the
results of a severely flawed computer program. Computer simu-
lations generally involve a degree of mathematical sophistication
not easily comprehended by most jurors. Experts typically have
impressive credentials and speak persuasively. In many cases, op-
posing counsel might have been able to expose the flaws in the
simulation if permitted to cross-examine the expert about them.
A second scenario is where an expert is required to disclose
the simulation in detail on cross-examination. The jury may be
confused by the technical difficulty of the simulation, and may
decide the facts based on inappropriate reasons. Some courts re-
strict cross-examination when the jury does not possess the requi-
site level of comprehension.76
The amount of latitude allowed attorneys under Rule 403 is com-
pletely within the discretion of the trial judge and will not constitute a
reversible error unless there is clear abuse of that discretion. 77
Finally, potential hearsay objections to computer simulations may
arise under Rules 80178 and 802.79 However, the hurdles are not insur-
mountable. First, there are several hearsay exceptions under Rule 803,80
These circumstances entail risks which range all the way from inducing decision on a
purely emotional basis, at one extreme, to nothing more harmful than merely wasting
time, at the other extreme. Situations in this area call for balancing the probative value
of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from its admission.
FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
76. Aldous, supra note 20, at 60-61 (citations omitted).
77. Fadely, supra note 3, at 870.
78. FED. R. EvlD. 801.
79. FED. R. EvID. 802. Rule 802 states: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority
or by Act of Congress." Id.
80. FED. R. EvlD. 803. The applicable portions of the rule are as follows:
Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:...
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made
at or near the time by or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indi-
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such as the Rule 803(8) public records and reports exception and the
Rule 803(24) residual exception.8 ' For example, a computer simulation
based upon third party testimony may involve hearsay problems. In con-
trast, a simulation based upon flight recorder data from a downed air-
liner would likely evade a potential hearsay objection because the flight
recorder data would qualify under Rule 803(6) hearsay exception as a
record of a regularly conducted activity.'
Second, if the facts and data underlying the computer simulation
were collected by the adverse party, they "may be admissible as an ad-
mission against that party's interest because of its trustworthiness 8 3
under the Rule 801 hearsay definitions. s4 However, the simulation itself
is not an adversary. It is the party collecting the data in this example
who is adverse. Finally, because expert testimony can be based upon
hearsay under Rule 703,5 this provides another "end around" for an
attorney to bring in material otherwise objectionable due to hearsay con-
flicts. In other words, data used in a simulation which would otherwise
be excluded under the hearsay rules could come in to evidence through
an expert witness, thus evading the hearsay issue.
cate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit....
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations,
in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or
agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and pro-
ceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from
an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of infor-
mation or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness....
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the forego-
ing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the gen-
eral purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars




83. Fadely, supra note 3, at 867.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
85. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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The Federal Rules of Evidence, therefore, offer quite liberal admis-
sion criteria for computer simulations. The bases of such rules are well
founded because their purpose is to facilitate jury comprehension of
complex issues. In a later section the dangers of such lenient standards
will be examined, as will an argument favoring more judicial scrutiny of
computer simulations.
The common thread laced throughout the many standards of admis-
sion regarding computer simulations is the ease with which it may be
accomplished. Depending on one's view of computer simulations, this
could be good or bad news. Whatever the prevailing attitude regarding
these simulations may be, the odds favoring admission greatly outweigh
the odds against it.
IV. COMPUTER SIMULATIONS' IMPACr ON JURIES
The purported advantage of computer simulations is that they make
a stunning impression on the minds of jurors. However, this can also be
viewed as a terrible disadvantage. One author explains: "The major
problem facing an opponent of a computer simulation is its impact on
the jury. Typically, the jury will think "I saw it on the TV" or "it says it
on that paper, therefore it must be true. '86 Whether or not one sees
such an impact as beneficial or detrimental to the judicial process, one
cannot argue that computer simulations do leave a substantial imprint on
the minds of jurors.
As the complexity of the issues presented to a jury increases, the
amount of interest, comprehension, and retention will decrease.87 For a
party presenting such complex issues to a jury, the object is to present
them in the most comprehensible, succinct, and attention-getting method
possible. The best way to accomplish this goal is by combining verbal
communication with other forms of communication, primarily visual.8"
One study pointedly demonstrates the advantages of using visual
communication:8 9
86. Murphy, supra note 4, at 158 (quoting MARx A. DOmBROFF, DOMBROFF ON UNFAIR
TAcncs § 14.37 (2d ed. 1988)).
87. Dombroff, supra note 9, at *3.
88. Id.
89. HARoLD WEISS & J.B. McGRATH, JR., TECHNICALLY SPEAKING: ORAL COMMUNICA-
TION FOR ENGINEERS, SCIENTISTS, AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL (1963), noted in Richard
Schechter, Use of Demonstrative Aids in the Trial of a Lawsuit, 21 TEx. TRIAL LAw. 3 (1987).
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Method of Retention After Retention After
Presentation 3 Hours 72 Hours
1. Telling (verbal) 70% 10%
2. Showing (visual) 72% 20%
3. Telling and Showing 85% 65%
The study clearly shows that visual presentation is more effective than
verbal communication, and that verbal communication is most effective
when coupled with a visual presentation. As one professional photogra-
pher put it, "[pictures] are images, directly entering the bloodstream,
bypassing the brain."90
The fact that a computer simulation is presented in the very comfort-
able medium of the television screen also affects jurors. One source esti-
mates that by the time average high school students graduate, they have
completed 11,000 hours of in-class work, yet have watched over 15,000
hours of television.91 One author comments:
Because of our physical makeup, acting in concert with the cul-
tural traits we have evolved, we are essentially visual learners.
For the members of our society, information is highly dependent
on visual stimuli. In fact, we retain 87% of the information which
is presented to us visually. When information is presented to us
through audio means, we retain only 10% of what we hear. Thus,
visual information does make an impact and is the most impor-
tant way we learn.92
The conclusion that logically flows from these results is that a com-
puter simulation-a visual presentation-will have a greater psychologi-
cal impact on a trier of fact than will a purely verbal presentation. The
following cases demonstrate what a powerful tool computer simulations
have been in litigation.
The first use of a computer simulation at trial was entitled "Hexane
Explosion," and was utilized in a Kentucky case in which a gas leak trig-
gered multiple explosions in Louisville.93 If a computer simulation
would not have been used, "the jury would have had to digest cumber-
some traditional forms of demonstrative evidence needed to make the
same points: diagrams of the chemical plant, maps of the city sewer sys-
90. J. Ric Gass, Defending Against Day in the Life Videos, PLI Order No. H4-5128, avail-
able in Westlaw, TP-ALL database, at *3 (1992).
91. R. Dennis Donoghue, Demonstrative Exhibits: A Key to Effective Jury Presentations,
PLI Order No. G4-3892, available in Westlaw, TP-ALL database, at *3 (1992).
92. Id.
93. Panian, supra note 1, at 1211 (citing Rebecca Kuzins, Pros and 'Cons of Videotape,
L.A. LAw., Nov. 1987, at 35).
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tern, eyewitness accounts of the explosion, and expert testimony on gas
chemistry.194 Instead, with the use of a computer simulation, the jury
was ostensibly able to "see" what happened.95 Two days after the jury
was shown the computer simulation of the hexane explosion, the defend-
ant settled the case for over $18 million. 6
In Connors v. United States,' both sides used computer simulations
in a case surrounding the crash of Delta Flight 191 on August 2, 1985.98
The case involved the death of 136 passengers and crew members, as
well as one person on the ground, after the airliner passed through a
small-but-violent wind system called a "microburst," or "windshear." 99
In the fourteen-month trial between Delta Airlines and the United
States government, $150 million to $200 million in wrongful death claims
hung in the balance. 100 In its computer simulations, the United States
Justice Department input 40 different parameters (including accelera-
tion, pitch, roll, and heading) to create a three-dimensional image of the
plane's last minutes, fused with the crew's recorded voices and weather
conditions. 1 ' Roy Krieger, one of the attorneys then working for the
Justice Department, described the role of the computer simulations as
"pivotal."'0" The federal district judge found in favor of the United
States in the Connors case.' 0 3
In Schmutz v. Boulder Community Hospital,'°4 the parents of Peter
Schmutz, an epileptic, brought a products liability and negligence action




97. 720 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, In Re Air Crash at Dallas/Ft. Worth Air-
port, 919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Connors v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 276 (1991).
Connors is discussed in Marcotte, supra note 49, at 53.
98. Marcotte, supra note 49, at 53.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 54. The flight recorder used on Delta Flight 191 was a newly designed "digital
flight-data recorder;" the first of its type to record an airline crash after the craft had passed
through a microburst. The final simulation showed not only the aircraft's movement with
respect to the storm, but also displayed the cockpit instrument readings on screen. Packaged
together with the voices of the crew, "[t]he various animations created an eerie feeling of
being there, of seeing and hearing what the crew experienced." See id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. No. 83 Civ. 1164 (Boulder 20th Dist. Ct. March 26,1992), cited in J. Stratton Shartel,
The Changing Litigation Landscape: Three Winning Uses of Technology, 6 No. 5 INSIDE Lmri.
WL 1, *11-12 (1992).
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gery. °5 As a result of a fall and subsequent head blow caused by a
seizure in February 1983, a blood clot formed in Peter's brain and re-
quired surgical removal.1 0 6 The surgeon used a device (manufactured by
defendant Codman & Shurtleff) called a Smith perforator to drill a hole
in Schmutz's skull. 10 7 The drill was designed to stop when it no longer
encountered solid matter, but it failed to do so during Schmutz's proce-
dure. The drill perforated the protective brain membrane and severed
branches of a brain artery which had wrapped around the drill bit.10 8 As
a result, Peter Schmutz suffered a massive stroke, leaving him perma-
nently brain damaged, paralyzed on the left side of his body, and par-
tially blind.10 9
Schmutz's parents sued Codman & Shurtleff alleging that the drill
was defective and that they failed to warn of the danger of the drill not
stopping." 0 Schmutz's parents also sued the hospital, alleging that it had
negligently assembled and cleaned the drill prior to surgery."' Through-
out the trial, counsel for plaintiff attempted to explain to the jurors ex-
actly what had occurred, yet they offered only anatomical diagrams as
visual illustration." 2 The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and
that verdict was affirmed by the appellate court." 3
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the verdict, however, and or-
dered a new trial." 4 The plaintiffs hired new counsel who presented a
computer simulation to the jury that demonstrated a Smith perforator
boring into a skull and severing the brain artery." 5 In this second trial,
the jury awarded the plaintiff $4.5 million in actual damages for negli-
gence against the hospital and Codman, as well as $1.5 million in puni-
105. Shartel, supra note 104, at *11-12.






112. Id. at *13.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *14. A unique problem, however, was posed by this particular simulation.
Since the features of every human skull and brain are unique, an exact replication would be
impossible. The graphic artist who created the simulation, Doug Filter, explained: "While I
was able to make good scale drawings of the drill ... I couldn't do the same for the plaintiff's
head because no one knew what the dimensions of the plaintiff's skull and brain artery were.
The surgery had made them impossible to determine." Filter therefore decided to journey to
New Hampshire to interview the surgeon, and his "aim was to portray the doctor's theory in
pictures." See id.
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tive damages against Codman." 6  While the plaintiffs' attorney
maintains that he never made any claims to the jury that the simulation
was an accurate representation of what actually had occurred, and that
he warned the jury that the simulation was simply an attempt to illus-
trate their theory regarding the case, the judge still admitted the
simulation.117
These are merely examples of how computer simulations have played
an integral role in the outcome of jury trials in which significant damages
are claimed, and there are many other analogous cases. These cases
demonstrate that computer simulations are extremely powerful tools,
which weigh heavily in the decision processes of a jury. One author
states:
When people receive information from the television they take it
as the truth. The reason for this is that television is the critical
medium today for gaining information, including news. Thus,
when evidence is presented in this format, it becomes "not only
believable, but virtually unassailable." If an attorney is not pre-
pared, a computer simulation... can become "an almost over-
whelming piece of evidence. '1 18
The following section will demonstrate that, for all of their advantages, a
tremendous potential exists for misuse and misunderstanding of these
"overwhelming piece[s] of evidence."
V. ABUSES, MISUNDERSTANDING, AND DIsADvANTAGEs
One author suggests six advantages of computer simulations with re-
spect to an effective jury presentation: (1) varied perspectives; (2) real
time or accuracy of timing; (3) slow and fast motion; (4) stop-action; (5)
highlighted elements; and (6) modifications for analysis.1 19 Each of
these advantages carries with it, however, a concomitant potential for
abuse or unintentional misuse that could manipulate a juror's impression
of a simulated event.
Varying perspectives allow the viewer of the computer simulation to
see inside anything from the human skull to an automobile engine.
Points of view can shift from any one of a multitude of angles, including
overhead, front, side, bird's eye, etc.'20 While this type of imaging can
116. Id. at *18-19.
117. Id. at *19.
118. Murphy, supra note 4, at 146 (quoting Feinerman, New Season for Video Law, 16
BAIRR= 15, 16 (1989)).




be impressive, it also can be used to manipulate the events being shown,
either intentionally or unintentionally. As one author explains, "[j]ust as
a writer uses punctuation, the selective use of a zoom, closeup and fade-
out can accent different points. A constantly moving object can appear
to change speed or direction by merely changing the point from where it
is viewed."1 2'
Because individual perceptions vary substantially with respect to
time, "[c]omputer simulations show what happened in real time, so that
each juror's perception is the same and accurate.' 122 The logical base
that this assumption rests upon, however, is that the data being fed into
the computer represents the actual time elapsed for the event to have
taken place. With a digital flight recorder, this may be extremely pre-
cise, but with an accident reconstructed from automobile skids and tra-
jectory estimates, this may be an unreliable piece of data. As the court
in Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp. explained, "[o]ur concern is not
with the precision of electronic calculations, but with the accuracy and
completeness of the initial data and equations which are used as ingredi-
ents of the computer program." 123
The advantage of slow and fast motion is that the event may be
slowed down or sped up to more clearly demonstrate events that either
transpired too quickly for a viewer to comprehend or too slowly to
demonstrate a coherent flow.'24 The corresponding disadvantage of
slow and fast motion is that the time frame in which the event took place
is distorted. The proponent can either elongate or truncate the elapsed
time of the event through repeated use of slow or fast motion.
The advantage of stop-action is that it "allows the expert to focus on
the most important moments while keeping them in the context of the
event."'" The bias regarding which moments are important and which
are not will be skewed in favor of the party presenting the computer
simulation. With stop action, the proponent will be able to focus on the
segments of the simulation that they want emphasized, while correspond-
ingly de-emphasizing those portions that cast their stance in an unfavora-
ble light. Furthermore, by stopping the action continuously, the
aforementioned advantage of real time may be effectively distorted to
121. Marcotte, supra note 49, at 56.
122. Schaefer et al., supra note 2, at 72.
123. 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Mass. 1977).
124. Schaefer et al., supra note 2, at 72.
125. Id.
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give the jury the conception that the action took longer than did its ac-
tual elapsed time.12s
The advantage of highlighting important elements of the event allows
the proponent "to focus on important physical phenomena, eliminating
extraneous background details that detract from the action, without
causing distortion or hindering admissibility."'127 At the same time, how-
ever, this allows for the "lowlighting" of other details in the simulation.
Often, admission of a simulation is contingent on the inclusion of specific
details with respect to the scene. Computer simulations allow for the de-
emphasis of significant details by highlighting those details the propo-
nent feels best demonstrate his or her position.
Finally, the advantage of modification for analysis allows for the re-
input of data, creating a different visual presentation "based on conflict-
ing testimony, eyewitness accounts, or opposing experts' analyses. 128 A
presentation displaying the opponent's position in a simulation that
works to the advantage of the proponent could be devastating to the
opponent's case. If the simulation is not completely accurate at its foun-
dation, the opponent's position could be misrepresented. If the software
was created with an initial bias favoring the proponent, good reason ex-
ists to believe that the opponent's "modified analysis" will also be
skewed in the proponent's direction.
Many authorities caution of the potential abuses with respect to com-
puter simulations:
While the computer may be used to generate, for use at trial, evi-
dence that can aid in the "search for truth," it may also be used
carelessly or in a biased fashion. Because the law on the admissi-
bility of computer-generated evidence is still in the developmen-
tal stage, casual or greedy use of this tool may adversely affect its
growth. Computer-generated evidence tends to mesmerize fact-
seekers and relax their natural critical natures, yet there is great
danger of it being erroneous, misleading, or unreliable. The un-
derlying data may be full of errors or discrepancies, or it may, for
126. An analogous situation involving the manipulative use of stop-action in a videotape
was that of the recent Rodney King trial. The Rodney King case involved several Los Ange-
les police officers who were unknowingly videotaped while beating Rodney King, a civilian
motorist. The focal piece of evidence in this case was the videotape, and the defendants'
attorneys were able to use stop-motion very effectively by dissecting every segment of the
video. By virtue of this technique, the attorneys were able to de-emphasize the brutality of
the event, slowing the real time to a snail's pace, and demonstrating the supposedly calculated
safety precautions taken by the officers.
127. Schaefer et al., supra note 2, at 72.
128. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 15.
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one reason or another, be irrelevant or improper as evidence.
The data may have been fed into the computer inaccurately. The
computer may have been improperly programmed or not
programmed to detect errors. The assumptions on which the pro-
gram was based may be wrong, illogical, or simply irrelevant to
the issues sought to be proved.129
As "[e]ach frame represents innumerable calculations and assumptions,"
each frame has the potential for intentional or unintentional
miscalculation. 130
As one accident-reconstruction expert explains, "[a]n animation art-
ist can make a car fly.... There are some so-called experts out there who
may be 50 percent or more off. Animation is only as good as the infor-
mation put into it.' 13 1 Furthermore, the software is sometimes not so-
phisticated enough for the accurate depiction of the inputted technical
data.13
2
While the most persuasive argument against the use of computer sim-
ulations may be potential abuses and jury misunderstanding, there are
other disadvantages to computer simulations, one of which is their ex-
pense. The computer simulations in the Connors case cost the U.S. Gov-
ernment between $100,000 and $150,000.133 That figure would also
double or triple if the costs of time and travel for expert witnesses were
added. 34 Prices can be upwards of $1,000 to $4,000 per second for a
completed three dimensional computer simulation.135 As technology is
advancing and demand is increasing, though, costs are dropping.136 The
high cost will tremendously disadvantage less wealthy clients and will
particularly favor prosecutors and wealthy defendants in criminal
trials.137
Finally, computer simulations can backfire. If the computer simula-
tion is too lengthy, its impact on the jurors may be lost.' 38 University of
Southern California Law School Professor William J. Genego explains,
"[h]igh-tech computer exhibits may cause a jury to be persuaded for the
129. Martha M. Jenkins, Computer-Generated Evidence Specially Prepared for Use at
Trial, 52 Cmi.-KENTr L. REv. 600 (1976), quoted in Murphy, supra note 4, at 160 n.129.
130. Panian, supra note 1, at 1212 (quoting Chernow, supra note 1, at 4).






137. Shartel, supra note 104, at *3.
138. Marcotte, supra note 49, at 56.
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wrong reasons because the graphics are colorful or entertaining, and not
because the facts are convincing. ' 139 This may work to the advantage of
the proponents, but it could also work to their disadvantage. As Robert
Seltzer, director of LSI Graphic Evidence in Los Angeles put it,
"[e]verybody comes back from lunch and you put the lights down. It's
like watching a movie. You might spend $100,000 and the jury goes to
sleep." 14o
Considering the potential for abuse and the many disadvantages sur-
rounding computer simulations, they should not necessarily be seen as
the panacea that many hold them out to be. The technology is fascinat-
ing, and it does have many advantages that have advanced litigation
techniques several levels. The flip side is that there are problems associ-
ated with the use of computer simulations in the courtroom, and those
who deal with them directly should be cognizant of this fact and should
work to streamline the rough edges.
VI. SOLVING THE PROBLEMS
Now that the many facets of computer simulations have been ex-
plored and the problems associated with them have been fleshed out, the
logical inquisitor asks what can be done to solve the problems? While
there are no air-tight responses to this question, there are steps that can
be taken to try to eradicate the abuses and make the use of computer
simulations in the courtroom more equitable.
First, attorneys must take more care to guard against the potential
abuses that they unknowingly commit, and more importantly that their
opponents make either intentionally or unintentionally. They must look
upon computer simulations as tools, but tools that require extremely fine
tuning. They must take every opportunity to object to their opposition's
biases and the incorrect factual foundations present in the computer sim-
ulations. Since this seems to be how many attorneys currently approach
the problem, this will not be a solution, but this constant vigilance is
necessary to keep the system in check.
Second, judges must delineate a stringent set of criteria through
which computer simulations must pass muster. One approach that may
tighten the gaps in the admissibility area would be to create a hybrid of
the aforementioned standards, and some courts have already done this.
For instance, the New York Supreme Court in People v. Daniels 41 estab-
139. Computer Graphics Aiding Jurors' Recall, N.Y. TnvEs, Nov. 24, 1989, at B27.
140. Marcotte, supra note 49, at 56.
141. 422 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1979).
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lished a three-tiered addition to the evidentiary status quo: (1) the court
may give the jury a cautionary instruction with respect to the computer
simulation; (2) the court may inquire from the expert witness as to his or
her qualifications, whether the technique used was reliable, and whether
the opinion is probative and relevant; and (3) the opponent may be per-
mitted to inquire as to the qualifications of the expert on cross-
examination.142
In Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,14 the Fifth Circuit sitting en
banc established a four-pronged test:
(1) Whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion,
Fed.R.Evid. 702;
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same
type as are relied upon by other experts in the field, Fed.R.Evid.
703;
(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-
founded methodology, Frye; and
(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702 and
703, and the Frye test, whether under Fed.R.Evid. 403 the testi-
mony's potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value.'"
This notion of a hybrid standard, then, would force the proponent to
exercise even greater care with respect to the foundational data, formu-
lae, and factual circumstances used in computer simulations.
Daubert's further liberalization of the admission standards in some of
these areas, though, signifies a movement in the opposite direction, lean-
ing more towards inclusion rather than exclusion of this evidence.
Even with greater care on the part of attorneys and tighter admissi-
bility standards, the problem of juror complacency still exists. The court
must take great pains in instructing juries as to the exact foundations of
computer simulations. The attorneys must be forced to make crystal
clear the distinction between what is fact and what is theory. The court
must play the role of educator and parent, as if one was dragging his or
her child away from the television and introducing them to new sources
of information and forcing them to think for themselves.
142. Id., quoted in Murphy, supra note 4, at 159.
143. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
144. Id. at 1110.
[Vol. 77:829
COMPUTER SIMULATIONS IN LITIGATION
VII. CONCLUSION
In Perma Research & Development v. Singer Co., a lone dissenter,
Judge Van Graafeiland, vehemently argued that more care needs to be
taken with respect to the admission of computer simulations:
As courts are drawn willy-nilly into the magic world of computer-
ization, it is of utmost importance that appropriate standards be
set for the introduction of computerized evidence .... Although
the computer has tremendous potential for improving our system
of justice by generating more meaningful evidence than was pre-
viously available, it presents a real danger of being the vehicle of
introducing erroneous, misleading, or unreliable evidence ... Be-
cause of the complexities of examining the creation of computer-
generated evidence and the deceptively neat package in which the
computer can display its work product, courts and practitioners
must exercise more care with computer-generated evidence than
with evidence generated by more traditional means.145
As a tool, computer simulations have revolutionized much of today's
tort litigation. They are here to stay, and those persons associated with
computer simulations must take the necessary steps to solve the many
problems surrounding them. It is too easy for a person steeped in the
television age to look at such a critical piece of evidence with ignorant
bliss and a dearth of skepticism. There is a great danger to our legal
system if those individuals who decide the fate of our legal controversies
do so "because a computer must be right." The phrase "garbage in,
garbage out" applies here more than ever, and attorneys, judges, and
jurors should be a bit more critical about what is fact and what is fiction.
ADAM T. BERKOFF
145. 542 F.2d 111, 124-25 (2d Cir.) (Van Graafeiland, L, dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
987 (1976).
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